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We investigate the responsiveness of individual retirement decisions to changes in financial 
incentives. The causal effect is identified based on the natural experiment generated by an 
institutional reform. The results of a binary retirement model are robust to alternative model 
specifications, to a competing risks framework with endogenous panel attrition, and to 
alternative representations of unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity. We find strong 
behavioral effects of changes in financial retirement incentives. A permanent reduction of 
retirement benefits by 3.4 percent induces a decline in the age-specific annual retirement 
probability by over 50 percent. The response to the reforms intensifies over time suggesting 
that retirement behavior may be affected by social norms. The response to changes in 
financial retirement benefits varies with educational background: those with low education 
respond most strongly to an increase in the price of leisure. 
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1.   Introduction  
  The funding of retirement is high on the policy agenda of many demographically 
aging industrialized countries. Retirement insurance funds are affected by individual behavior 
and it is important to know whether and to which extent behaviors respond to changes in the 
institutional framework. Therefore we study the impact of financial incentives on retirement 
behavior.
1 
  Since an understanding of the magnitude of workers' responsiveness to institutional 
reforms is crucial for policy design it is important to provide reliable empirical estimates. A 
large literature attempts to quantify the effect of retirement incentives, and the problems 
involved in identifying their causal effects are widely discussed (see e.g. Lumsdaine and 
Mitchell 1999, Coile and Gruber 2000 and 2007, or Chan and Stevens 2004). Much of the 
literature identified behavioral responses to financial incentives based on cross-sectional 
comparisons of individuals with different benefit claims and focused on the appropriate 
representation of dynamic incentives.
2 This approach mostly neglects the possibility of 
unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for retirement which might affect both incentives and 
responses. In their study of retirement expectations Chan and Stevens (2004) find that such 
heterogeneity has vast effects on the estimates of responses to retirement incentives. 
  An empirical approach that does not rely on cross-sectional identification takes 
advantage of natural experiments, such as institutional reforms of retirement finances. A 
classic example of this approach is Krueger and Pischke (1992). They show that workers 
affected by reduced retirement benefits did not respond as strongly as would have been 
expected based on prior findings. Similarly, Mastrobuoni (2006) investigates whether the 
1983 reform of the U.S. normal retirement age affected retirement behavior. Comparing the 
retirement behavior of birth cohorts subject to different retirement age regulations he finds 
substantial responses to this reform.  
                                                 
1   For a general discussion pension reform options see Lindbeck and Persson (2003). 
2   For cross-national comparative studies see e.g. Gruber and Wise (2004) or Duval (2004).  2
  Similar to these studies we take advantage of a reform in the retirement system to 
identify the effect of financial incentives on retirement behavior. The 1991 reform of the 
Swiss mandatory retirement insurance introduced two separate institutional modifications. On 
the one hand the normal retirement age for females was raised in two steps from 62 to 64. On 
the other hand the possibility of early retirement was introduced at the expense of a benefit 
discount, for both men and women. As these measures reflect policy options available in 
about every social security system it is both interesting and important to study their effects.
3 
  In addition, this study contributes to the literature in three ways: First, it identifies the 
labor supply response to retirement incentives by comparing the behavior of birth cohorts 
which differ only with respect to the financial incentives of a policy regime. In contrast to 
studies which rely on the cross-sectional identification of incentive effects, we can take 
advantage of an exogenous institutional reform. We know its precise timing and can therefore 
avoid any related measurement error. In addition, we avoid the problem that individuals may 
not be informed about their retirement incentives (Asch et al. 2005): the reform we look at 
here was subject to intense public debate due to a national public referendum (Bütler 2002). 
Second, we evaluate the heterogeneity of the behavioral response to the policy reform across 
various dimensions such as education and the unemployment situation in different regional 
labor markets. Song and Manchester (2007) find that there are large differences in the 
response to changes in the Social Security earnings test along the income distribution. Third, 
we investigate whether the behavioral response to the institutional change happens 
instantaneously or whether the adjustment process takes time. If retirement age is strongly 
affected by social norms the response to policy reforms might be dampened and protracted. 
Social norms play a key role in the debate on excess retirement at age 62 and 65 in the U.S. 
(cf. Lumsdaine et al. 1995, Duflo and Saez 2003), where they are discussed as a potential 
explanation.  
                                                 
3   For a discussion of the costs and benefits of alternative reforms see Burtless and Quinn (2002) or 
Lindbeck and Persson (2003).  3
  We find clear behavioral adjustments in response to changes in retirement incentives. 
Labor supply elasticities differ across population groups with heterogeneous educational 
backgrounds. The estimation results are robust to controls for endogenous panel attrition. The 
evidence suggests that the adjustment of retirement behavior to changed institutional 
circumstances intensifies over time.  
 
2.   Institutional Background and Hypotheses 
  The Swiss retirement system consists of a public social security pillar (AHV), 
financed mainly by payroll taxes on a pay-as-you-go basis, and of heterogeneous typically 
employer-based fully funded private pension systems as a second pillar (for a detailed 
description see, e.g. Bütler 2002 or Dorn and Sousa-Poza 2003). Both, the first and the 
second pillar are obligatory.
4 The public AHV pillar sets a minimum age as an eligibility 
criterion for benefit receipt, but not a mandatory retirement age. For men the eligibility age 
has always been 65, while women used to be able to retire at age 62. In 1991, a reform law 
(the "10th revision") was enacted, which was confirmed by a referendum in 1995. This 
reform prompted two types of changes that we summarize in Table 1 and use as a natural 
experiment: first, the minimum age for women's full retirement benefit eligibility was 
ratcheted up in two steps from 62 to 63 years in 2001, and to 64 years in 2005. The minimum 
retirement age for men remained at 65 years. Second, it became possible for women and men 
to retire prior to the minimum age. The option to draw retirement benefits one year (and later 
two years) prior to the minimum retirement age was connected with a permanent benefit 
discount, which amounted for men to a 6.8 percent benefit deduction for every year of early 
retirement.
5 Since women already suffered the disadvantage of postponed regular retirement, 
their benefit reduction was set to half that of men, i.e. 3.4 percent for retiring one year early 
                                                 
4    In addition, a third voluntary pillar consists of tax deductions for individual savings accounts. 
However, this instrument is not relevant for our analysis. 
5   The benefit discount for men is considered to be actuarially fair.   4
and 6.8 percent for retiring two years prior to the regular retirement age.
6 Table 1 reports the 
timing of the reform steps as well as the benefit reductions tied to early retirement.
7 
 
  Based on these reforms we expect behavioral adjustments in the timing of retirement. 
In the framework of an intertemporal consumption model individuals’ maximization problem 
at time t is given by: 
     
s.t.  , 
where R is the date of retirement, and utility u depends on the level of consumption cs and the 
amount of leisure if the individual is working (lw) or not (lr). The survival probability until 
period s is denoted as π(s), δ is the individual discount factor and r is the interest rate. At is 
the net present value of assets held in period t. The labor market income received prior to 
retirement is denoted as ys and bs(R) indicates the retirement benefits received from the date 
of retirement until death in period T. The stream of benefits depends on the date of retirement 
R. If benefits are a differentiable function with respect to R, the first order condition yields: 
  
       
The integral on the right hand side indicates the effect of retirement date R on pension 
accrual. The Swiss reform changed the benefit function for 62 years old women (and later on 
for 63 years old): in 2001 benefits after retirement at age 62 declined (initially) by 3.4 
percent. Consequently, since the reform it is more likely that the disutility connected to 
working at age 62 is offset by financial incentives. We expect the probability of continued 
work to increase after the reform first for women at age 62 and later for those at age 63. Their 
retirement propensity at age 62 and later at age 63 should decline.  
                                                 
6   Starting with birth cohort 1948, women will have the same benefit reduction rates as men. 
7  Individuals can also postpone benefit receipt for up to five years. Since 1991 this yields a maximum 
increase in benefits of 31.5 percent (BSV 2006).  5
For men at the age of 64 (and later at age 63) the difference between labor market 
income and pension decreased after the reform, as a pension became newly available (see the 
first term in brackets on the right hand side of the first order condition). This should result in 
a higher probability of labor force exit at that age. However, since benefit discounts are 
considered to be actuarially fair on average, total retirement wealth remains unaffected for an 
average individual, regardless of the date of retirement entry. Depending on individual time 
preferences and expected survival probabilities retirement at an early age is more or less 
attractive than late retirement (see the second term in brackets on the right hand side of the 
first order condition). While individuals with a low life expectancy and an above average 
discount factor will prefer to retire at age 64, individuals with a high life expectancy or a 
below average discount factor will not respond to the reform, but continue to claim benefits at 
the age of 65. Therefore, we expect modest shifts to early retirement among men. 
Additionally, we hypothesize that a given change in pension accrual should call up 
different responses depending on individual wealth. The multiplier λ at the right hand side of 
the first order condition can be interpreted as the shadow value of wealth and links losses in 
wealth to utility losses. The marginal utility of additional consumption might differ across 
individuals depending on their utility function and depending on their wealth level. In 
particular, we expect larger changes in marginal utility for those with little wealth such that 
the effect of the new incentives to delay retirement should be highest for those who most 
depend on public pensions and who have little alternative income in old age.  
We use individual human capital as proxy for wealth and expect that individuals with 
little human capital and education are unlikely to take advantage of the early retirement 
options which come at the price of retirement income.
8 Similarly, those in regions with a high 
                                                 
8   In a descriptive analysis of the correlates of early retirement based on the 2002 cross-section of our 
data, Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2005) find a significantly negative correlation of education with the propensity to 
retire early. Similary, immigrants and those in low income professions, with unemployment experience and low 
incomes are least likely to leave the labor force early. Similar evidence exists for Germany (Clemens et al. 
2007).  6
risk of unemployment may be hesitant to give up employment prematurely for an early 
retirement if the probability of a successful return to the labor market is low. This relates to 
the debate on whether it is pension wealth or pension accrual that drives retirement behavior 
(e.g. Samwick 1998). Controls for institutional rules and their exogenous changes over time 
allow us to measure the relevance of changes in pension accrual, which Samwick (1998) 
finds to be the central determinant of retirement behavior. We test whether the accrual effect 
differs across the wealth distribution. 
  Finally, in addition to testing whether behaviors respond to changed incentives we 
investigate the time pattern of the responses, i.e. whether (a) behavioral adjustments take time 
to intensify after the reform, (b) retirement behavior adjusts immediately at a single point in 
time without a time trend, or (c) response behavior disappears over time. All three patterns 
are possible. Mastrobuoni (2006) sets up an intertemporal retirement model where forward-
looking individuals smooth their lifetime consumption when they are given a long notice 
period regarding upcoming institutional changes. He argues that only those with little time to 
smooth their consumption paths would be expected to abruptly adjust their labor force exit 
behavior when an institutional reform occurs.
9 In this model the labor supply response to the 
reform should decline over time as individuals increasingly can take advantage of long term 
behavioral adjustments.  
  In contrast, option value models of retirement take account of modified financial 
consequences of retiring at every given age. Here, rational individuals are predicted to adjust 
optimal behavior paths immediately after a reform and to consequently change behaviors as 
soon as a reform is introduced, without a time lag or trend.  
  Since this type of model typically underpredicts the observed retirement propensity at 
focal points such as age 62 and 65 in the United States, many authors discuss the relevance of 
social norms for retirement behavior (e.g. Lumsdaine et al. 1995): it is common to retire at 65 
                                                 
9   For a recent analysis of the mechanisms behind non-smooth consumption paths see e.g. Blau (2008).  7
and because it is an accepted practice individuals behave this way. In this scenario behavior 
patterns of current and past peers affect current choices and it takes time until economically 
rational changes in retirement behavior are fully established. The hypothesis of consumption 
smoothing predicts a declining and the hypothesis of social norms an increasing 
responsiveness to institutional changes over time, while pure option value models lead one to 
expect a one-off change in behavior without adjustment paths in either direction. 
  In sum, we test five hypotheses: women postpone retirement when early retirement 
becomes costly, men retire earlier when it becomes possible, changes in retirement behavior 
vary with educational attainment and across regional labor markets and they intensify over 
time. 
 
3.   Data and Empirical Approach 
  Our data are taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS, 1991-2006
10). The 
SLFS is a rotating panel with up to five interviews per person covering a representative 
sample of the Swiss population.
11 In our analysis sample we follow those at risk of 
retirement, i.e. all individuals aged 60 through 65 who were members of the labor force when 
they were first interviewed. This provides us with 3,213 and 4,720 person-year observations 
for 1,773 different female and 2,450 different male labor force participants, for whom at least 
one transition can be observed. We thus follow the literature (e.g. Coile and Gruber 2007, 
Chan and Stevens 2004, or Song and Manchester 2007) and consider transitions to retirement 
conditional on labor force participation at the first interview. Therefore the causal effects 
measured in our approach can be considered as treatment effects on the treated rather than 
average treatment effects.  
                                                 
10  The German language name of the data is "Schweizerische Arbeitskräfteerhebung, BFS". 
11   A disadvantage of the data is that information on spouse characteristics, occupational pensions, and 
work history is unavailable. However, given that the policy change considered here is orthogonal to all 
individual characteristics except for birth year, this should not affect our results.  8
  Our dichotomous dependent variable describes whether a member of the labor force 
in year t indicates to have left the labor force in year t+1. In the weighted data we observe a 
transition to retirement among 31.1 percent of all females and 22.3 percent of all males. We 
consider retirement to be an absorbing state and censor observations thereafter. The 
dependent variable is described in the first row of Table 2, separately for males and females.  
  Figure 1 depicts the retirement probabilities by age over time: women's propensity to 
retire at age 62 clearly declined around 2001, when the first reform was implemented. 
Instead, the probability of retirement at age 63 went up and came down again when regular 
retirement age increased to age 64. The spike in the retirement propensity at age 64 in 2002 is 
spurious and related to an extremely small number of observations (across all birth cohorts 
only 30 women retired at age 64). Male retirement entry shows no clear response to the 
modified regulations which allowed retirement at age 64 starting in 1997 and at 63 since 
2001.  
  Unfortunately, the SLFS data do not inform on retirees' income sources, a problem 
frequently encountered in retirement analyses (e.g. Asch et al. 2005, Blundell et al. 2002). 
Therefore some of the individuals who exit the labor force may not be receiving benefits 
from the first pillar of the retirement insurance. Nevertheless, we follow the literature and 
refer to those who exit the labor force as retirement entrants.  
  In order to identify the shift in age-specific retirement propensities following 
institutional reforms we apply a difference-in-differences-type approach: we control for age 
(A), calendar year (Y), relevant interaction terms (I = A*Y), as well as a vector of control 
variables (X). If $ represents a vector of parameters we can write: 
Pr (retirement) = F ($0 + $1 A + $2 Y + $3 I + $4 X). 
  Our interaction terms (I) indicate the groups whose behavior should be affected by the 
modified retirement incentives: the propensity to retire should decline for 62 year old females 
after 2000 and again after 2004, similarly for 63 year old women after 2004. For men, we  9
expect increasing inflows into retirement for the 64 (63) year olds after 1996 (2000). The 
reform effects are identified both by a comparison of given age groups over time as well as 
by year effects across different age groups. Besides age, calendar year, and interaction terms 
(3 indicators for females, 2 for men) we control for different specifications of the covariate 
vector X, which consider education, marital status, industry, and regional indicators. We 
separately model the retirement choices of males and females as they are subject to different 
regulatory regimes. Descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables for both subsamples 
are provided in Table 2. 
  The difference-in-differences approach reliably estimates the causal effect of the 
institutional change if no contemporaneous shock other than the reform affects retirement 
behavior of the treatment group relative to the control group. Thus, in the absence of a reform 
any change in retirement behavior would be identical for treatment and control group. We 
assume that this condition holds. As a first approach to corroborate this assumption we 
compare the characteristics of treatment and control groups in Table 3. Given the considered 
reform one can define five different treatment and control group pairs. We randomly chose to 
look at two examples: women aged 62 before and after the reform in 2001 and men aged 64 
before and after the reform in 1997. As expected, average characteristics do not differ 
substantially for the treatment and control groups. Significant differences can either be 
explained by general demographic shifts to higher educational degrees over time or they 
concern only small subgroups. Overall, they do not cast doubt on our identification strategy. 
 
  Our empirical approach proceeds in four steps. First, we apply a dichotomous logit 
estimator to estimate the parameter vector $ and to determine the impact of the retirement 
reform on retirement behavior.
12 As we use panel data we can enhance the efficiency of the 
logit estimator by applying a random effects model. Assuming that individual unobserved 
                                                 
12   We obtained very similar results when a least squares estimator was applied. As we intend to study 
predicted probabilities we prefer to consider a logit estimator to the linear model.  10
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the covariates, we compare random effects estimators with 
normally distributed errors and with a non-parametric discrete-factor error term distribution.
13
  In step two of the analysis we gauge the robustness of our results and compare three 
alternative specifications: specification 1 considers age, calendar year and the interaction 
effects discussed above. Specification 2 adds controls for educational attainment and marital 
status, and specification 3 additionally controls for industry of last employment as well as 
region of residence.  
  An important characteristic of our data is that the SLFS suffers from panel attrition. In 
step three of our analysis we investigate whether non-random panel attrition affects our 
results: if the unobserved determinants of panel attrition also affect transitions to retirement 
or to continued employment this neglected heterogeneity will generate inconsistent estimates. 
To test the hypothesis that no such heterogeneity exists we replace the binomial dependent 
variable with a multinomial outcome measure, considering panel exit as a competing risk. 
With the new dependent variable we can use a large sample of 3,508 observations for men 
and 2,429 observations for women of which as before 1,086 and 958 are observed to transit to 
retirement. 29.5 and 26.4 percent of the male and female observations are censored due to 
attrition.
14 We reestimate our models within the framework of a multinomial logit estimator. 
To relax the restriction of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption we 
allow for error term correlation in the form of random effect specifications and evaluate the 
reform effects in this framework. In addition, we apply a Hausman test to determine whether 
panel attrition is an independent outcome. If its unobserved determinants are not correlated 
with those of transitions to retirement, we can rely on the binomial logit estimator. 
  In step four of the analysis we test whether the treatment effect of the retirement 
reform is heterogeneous over time, across education groups, and for the German and French 
                                                 
13   See Heckman and Singer (1984) and for software implementation Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004). 
14   The share of transitions to retirement now amounts to 21.9 percent for women and 16.2 percent form 
men, somewhat below those presented in Table 2.  11
speaking regions of Switzerland. These regions differ in their economic and particularly in 
their labor market situation,
15 where we take the local labor market situation to be indicative 
of different levels of income and social security wealth.
16 
 
4.   Results  
4.1 Baseline  Results 
  In the first step of our analysis we compared alternative logit estimators. Table 4 
presents estimation statistics (log likelihood values, number of parameters, and AIC statistic) 
of three logit estimators using the model specifications as outlined above. Based on a 
likelihood ratio test the explanatory power of two random effect estimators (columns 2 and 3) 
can be compared to that of the standard logit in column 1. The addition of random effects 
improves the log likelihood values significantly at the one percent level for the female 
sample, while the improvement in the likelihood values is not statistically significant for men. 
Since the random effect models in columns 2 and 3 are not nested we apply the AIC criterion 
to compare their fit: the discrete random effect distribution always provides a better fit than 
the normal random effect in the estimations for females. For men, the difference between the 
estimators is minor. Based on the stronger results for females we chose the random effects 
model with a discrete error term distribution.
17 All estimations with discretely distributed 
random effects use a specification with two masspoints. The hypothesis that a third masspoint 
improves the model fit was rejected in all cases. 
 In  Table 5 we present our estimation and prediction results. Panels A and C show the 
estimated coefficients with standard errors for the female and male subsamples. Panels B and 
                                                 
15    Unemployment rates are generally higher in the French speaking regions. In 2007 and 2008 they 
reached 4.2 and 3.9 percent there compared to 2.2 and 2.1 percent in the German language region. Also, average 
earnings differ with higher levels in German speaking cantons (BFS 2008). For a general discussion of the 
phenomenon see Brügger et al. (2009). 
16   Income and social security wealth are not considered directly in the specifications, first, because they 
should be endogenous to retirement behavior, and second, because social security wealth as a function of past 
earnings and labor force participation is unavailable in our data. 
17   The results are not sensitive to the choice of the estimator.  12
D display the retirement probabilities which were predicted for the entire sample with and 
without treatment based on the estimation results presented just above.
18 
  For the female sample the coefficients of the incentive effects in the first rows of 
panel A are highly statistically significant and confirm the expected decline in the probability 
of retirement at age 62 and 63 when benefit cuts were introduced. The effect is quantified in 
Panel B: based on specification 1 the predicted retirement propensities at age 62 differ 
significantly for women with and without the reform. The age-specific annual retirement 
probabilities changed substantially by 53 percent from 46.4 percent before the reform to 21.9 
percent after a benefit reduction of 3.4 percent was mandated in 2001. The retirement 
probability dropped to 21.0 percent after the benefit reduction of 6.8 percent was introduced 
in 2005. At age 63 the responsiveness of Swiss women is smaller. Here, the drop in 
retirement probabilities amounted to about 24 percent (from 39.5 to 29.9 percent) following 
the introduction of the 3.4 percent benefit discount in 2005. The results with additional 
control variables are presented in subsequent columns and do not differ substantially: the 
coefficients of the incentive indicators remain statistically significant and the predicted 
changes in retirement probabilities are of similar magnitude. We bootstrapped the standard 
errors of the difference in predicted retirement probabilities before and after the reform. The 
decline in retirement probabilities is highly significant for the 62 years old women and 
significant at least at the 10 percent level for the 63 year olds. Thus the reform had significant 
effects on behavior and the older female labor force responded strongly to shifts in retirement 
incentives.  
 
  At first glance, these results are remarkably close to those found by Mastrobuoni 
(2006): he obtained a drop in retirement probabilities by fifty percent for every year the U.S. 
normal retirement age was postponed, which matches our result for the 62 year olds. 
                                                 
18   We predicted each individual retirement probability and integrated it out over the estimated distribution 
of the random effect. Then we calculated the average retirement probability across all individual predictions.   13
However, since Mastrobuoni (2006) investigated a scenario with twice the benefit reduction 
compared to the Swiss case and one where workers are substantially older, Swiss women at 
age 62 appear to be more responsive. Samwick (1998) also predicted the effect of changes in 
the normal retirement age (NRA) on social security receipt. He jointly considers several 
reforms and concludes that a shift of the NRA from 65 to 67 reduces the cumulative 
probability of retirement by age 70 by one percentage point. Hanel (2009) models the effect 
of a reform similar to the Swiss one in the institutional framework of Germany: shifting NRA 
by 5 years from age 60 to 65 combined with a benefit discount of 3.6 percent for every year 
of retirement prior to age 65 generates a reduction in the propensity to retire at age 60 by 90 
percent. The effect is comparable in magnitude to that found for Swiss retirees, who have to 
sacrifice 6.8 percent of their benefit for two years of early retirement at age 63. In the Swiss 
case we find the retirement propensity to decline by about 56 percent. Thus, while our results 
for females suggest a larger responsiveness than comparable studies based on U.S. data they 
are comparable in magnitude to results from a neighboring country.
19  
  To test the plausibility of our results and interpretations we performed a "placebo 
analysis" for the female sample, in the spirit of Angrist and Krueger (1999, section 2.4). We 
test (a) whether the probability of female retirement at age 62 also changed significantly in 
other periods and (b) whether the probability of retirement in the period 2001-2004 changed 
significantly for other age groups, as well. If these effects are statistically significant we 
cannot be certain that the measured response is in fact caused by the reform. The estimation 
results are presented in Table 6. Column (1) presents the results as in Table 5(3). In column 
(2) we control for the calendar year specific retirement probability of 62 years old women. 
Not surprisingly, even with these detailed controls our main incentive effects remain large 
and statistically significant. The estimated coefficients suggest that over the course of the 
                                                 
19   Börsch-Supan et al. (2004) find a reduction in the retirement propensity of German women at age 60 
by between 50 and 70 percent when NRA is raised from 60 to 65 and the benefit discount amounts to 6 percent 
per year of early retirement.  14
1990s the probability of retirement at age 62 increased. While we have no explanation for the 
significantly lower levels in the early 1990s the evidence supports our previous conclusions: 
it is only after 2000 that the probability of retirement at age 62 started to decline significantly, 
exactly when the benefit cuts were enacted.
20 In column (3) we test, whether the retirement 
probability in 2001-2004, i.e. after the first shift in retirement incentives for 62 years old 
women, changed significantly for other age groups as well: the retirement probability for the 
63 year old women increased and there were no significant changes in the behaviors of other 
age groups. In column (4) we confirm this result by modeling the joint effect all age groups 
older than 62. The increase for the 63 years old is the immediate consequence of the reform 
which caused 62 year old women to postpone retirement by one year. Out of the group of the 
61, and 64-69 years old women we find a significant change at the 10 percent level only for 
the small group of 66 year olds. When the different age groups are considered jointly all 
effects are separately and jointly insignificant, thus corroborating our evidence in favor of 
causal reform effects. 
 
  The estimated response of men to changes in retirement regulations are much more 
modest. The newly introduced possibility of early retirement has no significant effect on 
retirement behavior (see Table 5, Panel C). When early retirement was first allowed at age 64 
the overall probability of labor force exit at that age increased slightly, yet no specification 
yields significant changes in predicted retirement propensities (see Panel D). After the second 
reform in 2001, which allowed retirement at age 63, we again find a small increase in the 
propensity to retire early. The results are robust across specifications but yield no significant 
                                                 
20   There were no changes to the eligibility rules in the first and second pillar of the retirement system at 
the time. Since the specification controls for calendar year fixed effects general labor market trends also cannot 
explain the observed patterns. However, Bütler et al. (2004) present evidence for a secular shift to earlier 
retirement ages for men and women over the 1990s. Mean female retirement age in their firm-specific data 
dropped from 61.5 to 60.2 years between the periods of 1990-1994 and 2000-2003. The authors consider early 
retirement options to explain this development. This suggests that the increasing retirement probability at age 62 
in the early 1990s may correspond to increasing labor force exit at earlier ages. This is the opposite of the 
developments observed starting 2000, when retirement shifted to higher ages. Therefore the significant effects 
found for the first years in our data does not seem to pose a problem for our analysis.  15
response of male retirement behavior to the reform.
21 Possible explanations of the difference 
in responses observed for females and males may relate to a variety of issues: (i) differences 
in the actuarial fairness of the reform, (ii) differences due to longer life-expectancies for 
women or similarly higher time discount rates for men, and (iii) higher risk aversion among 
females who do not want to run the risk a long life with low benefits. In addition, the results 
match existing evidence, which shows that the labor supply elasticity of older women with 
respect to retirement benefits is higher than that of older men (Blau and Riphahn, 1999). 
 
4.2  Effects of Panel Attrition 
  As discussed above, our data raise the concern of endogenous panel attrition.
22 If the 
propensity to leave the survey is correlated with the individual response to the retirement 
reform our estimators generate biased coefficients and predictions. To test the robustness of 
our outcomes to this concern we reformulated our dependent variable and reestimated the 
determinants of the transition to retirement while at the same time controlling for possible 
endogenous panel attrition. We applied a multinomial logit model with and without random 
effects. In a first step we evaluated - as before - the fit of alternative estimators to the data 
(see Table 7). The results are very similar to those presented in Table 4: both, the random 
effects estimators with normally and discretely distributed random effects significantly 
improve on the cross-sectional approach. Since - based on the AIC criterion - the discrete 
random effects specification provides the best fit we use this estimator for our robustness test. 
We do not present the results of the multinomial logit estimations to save space (the results 
are available upon request). The estimated coefficients of the incentive indicator for the 
probability of retirement relative to the probability of employment are highly significant and 
negative for females and insignificant for males.  
                                                 
21   We additionally performed all estimations and predictions applying both a linear probability model and 
alternative logit estimators and always obtained very similar results. 
22   Only about 30 percent of all interviewees reach the fifth interview in our rotating panel survey. All 
others leave the survey before that.  16
  Table 8 summarizes the predicted retirement probabilities obtained based on the 
binomial and multinomial logit estimations for the two gender subsamples using three model 
specifications.
23 The impact of the retirement reform is quantified by a comparison of 
retirement probabilities predicted for the situation with and without the reform. The direction 
of the predicted effect agrees for the two considered estimators and its magnitude is generally 
quite similar: women aged 62 reduced their retirement probability by about 50 percent and 
those at age 63 by about 25 percent. Men increased their transition rates to retirement at age 
64 (63) by about 7 (28) percent. The similarity of the results across estimators informally 
supports the hypothesis that panel attrition does not bias the binomial logit estimator.  
  A Hausman test of the independence of irrelevant alternatives property of the 
multinomial logit estimator provides a more formal test of the hypothesis that panel attrition 
is independent of the other considered outcomes. The test compares the coefficient vector of 
one outcome alternative (e.g. transition to retirement) relative to a given baseline outcome 
(e.g. transition to continued labor force participation) using both, the logit and the 
multinomial logit estimators (Hausman and McFadden 1984). We performed the test for both 
subsamples and all three model specifications.
24 The results (see Table 9) indicate that the 
hypothesis of identical coefficient vectors for the two estimators cannot be rejected. 
Therefore attrition is an independent event and we can rely on the binomial logit estimator.  
 
4.3 Heterogeneity  of  Treatment Effects 
  In the fourth step of our empirical analysis we investigate the heterogeneity of the 
reforms' treatment effects. We are interested in changes over time, in differences between 
individuals in the German and French language regions of Switzerland, and between groups 
                                                 
23   We present the predicted probability of retirement relative to the joint probability of either retiring or 
staying in the labor force. The binomial results are identical to those presented in Table 5 above.  
24   While the comparison presented in Table 8 requires that we relax the IIA assumption – otherwise 
predicted probability ratios are necessarily identical – the Hausman test requires that we do not relax IIA. 
Considering random effects and thus allowing for correlated error terms across alternatives would eliminate the 
IIA property of the estimator. Therefore the random effects specification was not considered in the framework 
of the Hausman test.  17
with different levels of human capital. Table 10 presents the estimation results of 
specifications which test for significant differences in the reform effect over time (columns 1 
and 2) and regional labor markets (columns 3 and 4) based on model specification (3), as 
presented before. Given that our data describe only one year after the introduction of the 
second reform step for females, the effect of a time trend for women can only be studied for 
the first reform. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant 
at the five percent level. This suggests that female retirement probabilities continued to 
decline in the years after the first reform. For the male sample both reform steps can be 
interacted with a time trend. Here, both coefficients are positive indicating rising retirement 
probabilities over time. However, the coefficients are neither individually nor jointly 
significant. Overall we thus find weak evidence for a protracted effect of the reform. Ceteris 
paribus, this can be interpreted as evidence in favor of a social norm which may inhibit an 
immediate behavioral adjustment to changed incentives.
25 
 
  We evaluate the heterogeneity of the treatment effects across regional labor markets 
and education groups, to gauge whether differences in social security wealth might affect the 
response to the new retirement incentives. Our expectation was to find more elastic labor 
supply responses among those with low wages, low wealth, and in weaker labor markets.  
  The last columns of Table 10 yield that there are no significant differences in 
responses to retirement reforms between individuals in the German and French regional labor 
markets of Switzerland. Only on average women in western Switzerland appear to have a 
higher retirement propensity than those in the German-speaking region. This confirms results 
of additional estimations (not presented) where we failed to find any heterogeneity in 
responses to the retirement reform based on regional unemployment, on actual or predicted 
                                                 
25   The information on changes in retirement incentives was available since 1991 and had been broadly 
publicized through a public referendum on the issue in 1995 (Bütler 2002).  18
individual unemployment. These results match the findings of Samwick (1998): once controls 
for pension accrual are considered, we find no behavioral effects of pension wealth. 
  Finally, we added education group interaction terms to our model in specification (3). 
Figures 2 (a) and (b) depict the predicted age-specific retirement probabilities for females 
and males, by education group and at different points in time: the initial pre-reform 
retirement probability at age 62 (or 63) was highest among the least educated women. For all 
education groups we observe a clear drop in the probability that females retire at age 62 after 
the reforms. The drops after 2001 and 2005 are significant at the 1 percent level for the two 
lower educational (standard errors were obtained by bootstrap). The absolute size of the 
decline is largest for females with low levels of education (28.7 and 24.0 percentage points in 
2001 for those with lower and upper secondary education). The response of the tertiary 
education group is much smaller. For them retirement probabilities declined by 11.5 
percentage points in 2001 and fell only slightly more in 2005. The new retirement incentives 
at age 63 again yield comparatively larger drops in retirement probabilities among those with 
less human capital. Thus, women with lower human capital and possibly lower wages, 
earnings, and wealth respond most strongly to the increased price of leisure at old age. 
  An inspection of retirement probabilities among men confirms that individuals with 
lower levels of human capital appear to be more likely to retire prior to age 65. The 
introduction of early retirement (labeled incentive) is expected to generate an increase in 
retirement probabilities. However, the reform in 1997, which allowed for early retirement at 
age 64, yielded an increase only for the two higher education subsamples. In 2001, we 
observe particularly men at middle education levels to respond to the new opportunity and 
retire significantly earlier. In general, male responses to the new retirement options remain 
weak and do not seem to reflect a large demand for more flexible early exit opportunities.  
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5.   Conclusions 
  This study has identified the effect of financial incentives on retirement behavior 
taking advantage of the natural experiment of exogenous institutional reforms in Switzerland. 
This source of identification helps avoid the substantial biases of up to 50 percent that e.g. 
Chan and Stevens (2004) found when they compared the results of cross-sectional 
estimations with those obtained when controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity. 
  The reform of the Swiss retirement insurance increased normal retirement age for 
females born after 1940 in two steps from 62 to 64 years. After the reform female retirees at 
age 62 incurred a benefit reduction of initially 3.4 and later 6.8 percent. The modification of 
the normal retirement age is a potent policy instrument as it affects both, the length of the 
contribution period as well as the duration of benefit payments.
26 Additionally, the reform 
introduced the option of early retirement at an actuarially fair benefit discount for men. 
  We apply a difference-in-differences type procedure and confirm the robustness of 
our results with respect to alternative model specifications and estimators. We find 
substantial responses to the shift of the regular retirement age in connection with benefit 
reductions for females: a reduction in benefits by 3.4 (6.8) percent, caused a decline in the 
retirement probability at age 62 from 46 to 22 (21) percent, i.e. by over 50 percent. The 
probability of retirement at age 63 drops from 40 to 30 percent, i.e. by 25 percent after benefit 
discounts of 3.4 percent were implemented. Permitting early retirement for men at a benefit 
discount has only small and insignificant effects on labor force exit behavior. Since generally 
behavioral adjustments intensify over time a social norm may affect behavioral choices of 
Swiss workers.
27 Females with low education show the strongest response to changes in 
retirement incentives and appear to be most reluctant to incur a decline in benefit payments. 
                                                 
26   For OECD recommendations on retirement policy reforms see Casey et al. (2003); also Lindbeck and 
Persson (2003) have a comprehensive discussion. 
27   However, we cannot separately identify the effect of a social norm and of birth cohort effects.  20
  Overall, retirement behavior shows a substantial response to changes in incentives. At 
the same time one can argue that the effect for Switzerland may indicate a lower bound on 
the effect possible in other countries, because the reform here affects only the first pillar of 
the retirement insurance system while the other pillars remained unchanged.
28 We expect 
stronger effects if a reform comprehensively addresses all funding sources for retirement. Our 
findings confirm prior studies (e.g. Asch et al. 2005) and suggest that financial retirement 
incentives may still be able to substantially affect the retirement plans of the generations to 
come and therefore can contribute to solve the funding problems of retirement insurance 
funds. 
                                                 
28   Coile and Gruber (2007) find that individuals are equally responsive to social security and pension plan 
incentives.  21
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Table 1  Regular Retirement Age and Early Retirement Options after the 1991 Reform 
 
   Men     Women   
Retirement 
Regime as of  
Regular Retirement 
Age 
Early Retirement Age 
(% Benefit Reduction) 
Regular Retirement 
Age 
Early Retirement Age 
(% Benefit Reduction) 
1996 65  -  -  62 -  - 
1997 - 2000  65  64 (6.8 %)  -  62 -  - 
2001 - 2004  65  64 (6.8 %)  63 (13.6 %)  63  62 (3.4 %)  - 









labor force exit 0.311 0.223
Incentive:
  age 62 after 2000 0.051 --
  age 62 after 2004 0.022 --
  age 63 after 2004 0.037 --
  age 64 after 1996 -- 0.127
  age 63 after 2000 -- 0.069
Age:
  age = 60 0.162 0.128
  age = 61 0.227 0.182
  age = 62 0.184 0.205
  age = 63 0.145 0.196
  age = 64 0.117 0.164
  age = 65 0.101 0.080
  age = 66 0.039 0.029
  age = 67 0.019 0.012
  age >= 68 0.007 0.003
Marital status:
  married 0.548 0.828
  single 0.098 0.059
  widowed/ divorced 0.354 0.113
Calendar Year 1998.1 (4.61) 1997.7 (4.47)
Education:
  higher education 0.119 0.307
  secondary education 0.499 0.491
  lower education 0.382 0.201
Industry:
  agriculture and mining 0.063 0.104
  utility (electric power, water) and construction 0.136 0.347
  trade, transport and communication 0.221 0.182
  hotel and catering trades 0.100 0.019
  credit and insurance, real estate investment 0.113 0.150
  public administration 0.038 0.055
  education and health sector 0.215 0.086
  other 0.114 0.057
Region:
  Lake Geneva Region 0.150 0.165
  Swiss Mittelland 0.240 0.228
  North-Western Switzerland 0.132 0.135
  Zurich 0.198 0.179
  Eastern Switzerland 0.164 0.148
  Central Switzerland 0.085 0.105
  Ticino 0.030 0.039




Source: Own calculations using weighted data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (1991-2006). 
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  married 53.2% 57.0% -3.8% 4.4% 84.0% 82.3% 1.7% 3.5%
  single 13.8% 8.3% 5.5% 2.7% * 7.7% 5.1% 2.6% 2.6%
  widowed/ divorced 33.0% 34.7% -1.7% 4.0% 8.3% 12.6% -4.2% 2.5%
Education
  higher education 8.6% 10.3% -1.8% 2.4% 35.1% 27.9% 7.2% 4.4%
  secondary education 48.6% 56.8% -8.2% 4.4% 41.1% 53.1% -12.0% 4.6% *
  lower education 42.9% 32.8% 10.0% 4.4% * 23.8% 19.1% 4.8% 4.2%
Industry:
  agriculture and mining 7.9% 3.4% 4.5% 2.5% 9.3% 8.6% 0.7% 2.9%
  utility and construction 16.6% 13.1% 3.5% 3.2% 36.5% 37.3% -0.8% 4.6%
  trade, transport communic. 21.7% 22.8% -1.2% 3.7% 21.0% 17.5% 3.4% 3.9%
  hotel and catering trades 7.4% 7.8% -0.3% 2.3% 0.2% 2.5% -2.3% 0.8% **
  credit, insurance, real estate 10.9% 10.8% 0.1% 2.6% 11.3% 15.1% -3.8% 3.0%
  public administration 3.7% 6.0% -2.2% 1.8% 6.4% 3.4% 3.0% 2.1%
  education and health 22.8% 26.3% -3.5% 3.8% 8.9% 9.7% -0.7% 2.5%
  other 8.9% 9.8% -0.8% 2.6% 6.4% 5.9% 0.5% 2.2%
Region:
  Lake Geneva Region 17.8% 14.5% 3.2% 3.1% 14.7% 18.3% -3.6% 3.0%
  Swiss Mittelland 22.2% 26.9% -4.7% 3.9% 24.0% 19.3% 4.7% 4.2%
  North-Western Switzerland 13.7% 12.9% 0.9% 2.9% 13.9% 12.7% 1.2% 3.1%
  Zurich 17.6% 16.2% 1.4% 3.3% 18.3% 17.4% 0.9% 3.5%
  Eastern Switzerland 18.4% 14.3% 4.0% 3.4% 14.2% 16.1% -1.9% 3.5%
  Central Switzerland 7.1% 10.7% -3.5% 2.4% 11.5% 12.5% -1.0% 3.4%
  Ticino 3.1% 4.5% -1.4% 1.9% 3.4% 3.6% -0.3% 1.6%
Observations (unweighted) 353 389 209 709
Women at age 62 Men at age 64
 
Note: ** and * indicate statistically significant differences between treatment and control group at the 
1 and 5 percent level. 
 
Source: Own calculations using weighted data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (1991-2006). 
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Log Likelihood -1879.5 -1873.8 -1871.8
# of parameters 26 27 28
AIC 3811.1 3801.5 3799.5
Log Likelihood -1860.6 -1855.7 -1853.3
# of parameters 30 31 32
AIC 3781.2 3773.3 3770.6
Log Likelihood -1851.0 -1846.4 -1844.4
# of parameters 43 44 45
AIC 3788.0 3780.9 3778.9
B - Men
Log Likelihood -2332.6 -2331.4 -2331.3
# of parameters 25 26 27
AIC 4715.2 4714.9 4716.7
Log Likelihood -2316.0 -2315.1 -2315.0
# of parameters 29 30 31
AIC 4690.1 4690.3 4692.0
Log Likelihood -2290.7 -2289.6 -2288.6
# of parameters 42 43 44
AIC 4665.4 4665.2 4665.1









age, year, education, marital status
age, year, education, marital status, 
industry, region
age, year
age, year, education, marital status
 
 
Note: Critical values of the chi
2 distribution are as follows: 1 percent level: 6.63 (1 df) and 9.21 (2 df); 




Table 5  Estimation and Prediction Results – Random Effects Logit (Discrete  
  Distribution) 
Specif. 1 Specif. 2 Specif. 3
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
A - Women: Estimation results Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Incentive 2001: age 62 after 2000 -1.546 ** -1.548 ** -1.540 **
0.274 0.270 0.273
Incentive 2005a: age 62 after 2004 -1.678 ** -1.674 ** -1.691 **
0.318 0.312 0.315
Incentive 2005b: age 63 after 2004 -0.531 * -0.581 * -0.587 *
0.241 0.240 0.242
Age (9) yes ** yes ** yes **
Year (15) yes yes * yes °
Education (3) -- yes ** yes **
Marital status (3) -- yes yes
Industry (8) -- -- yes
Region (7) -- -- yes
Log Likelihood -1871.76 -1853.32 -1844.44
# parameters estimated 28 32 45
B - Women: Predicted retirement probability 
Age 62, without incentive 0.464 0.465 0.456
Age 62, with incentive 2001 0.219 0.216 0.217
Difference -0.245 ** -0.249 ** -0.239 **
Standard Error of Difference 0.041 0.067 0.065
Age 62, without incentive 0.464 0.465 0.456
Age 62, with incentive 2005a 0.210 0.207 0.206
Difference -0.254 ** -0.258 ** -0.250 **
Standard Error of Difference 0.046 0.066 0.070
Age 63, without incentive 0.395 0.400 0.401
Age 63, with incentive 2005b 0.299 0.295 0.296
Difference -0.096 -0.105 ° -0.105 °
Standard Error of Difference 0.069 0.057 0.060
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
C - Men: Estimation results Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Incentive 1997: age 64 after 1996 0.134 0.102 0.098
0.244 0.244 0.247
Incentive 2001: age 63 after 2000 0.327 0.327 0.311
0.224 0.224 0.227
Age (9) yes ** yes ** yes **
Year (15) yes yes yes
Education (3) -- yes ** yes **
Marital status (3) -- yes yes
Industry (8) -- -- yes **
Region (7) -- -- yes
Log Likelihood -2331.34 -2314.98 -2288.56
# parameters estimated 27 31 44
D - Men: Predicted retirement probability 
Age 64, without incentive 0.177 0.179 0.179
Age 64, with incentive 1997 0.193 0.192 0.192
Difference 0.017 0.013 0.013
Standard Error of Difference 0.038 0.048 0.036
Age 63, without incentive 0.131 0.130 0.129
Age 63, with incentive 2001 0.167 0.167 0.164
Difference 0.036 0.037 0.035
Standard Error of Difference 0.025 0.024 0.026  
  28
Note: **, * and 
o indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. In panels B and D 
the asterisks indicate the statistical significance of the difference between the predicted probabilities 
under old and new regulations. Standard errors were bootstrapped with 100 draws from the original 
sample. Weighted data are applied. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of categories 
including the reference.  29
Table 6  Placebo-Analysis: Estimation and Prediction Results – Random Effects Logit 
  (Discrete  Distribution)  with  contrafactual incentive effects 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Incentive 2001: age 62 2001-2004 -1.540 0.273 ** -2.627 0.592 ** -1.105 0.471 * -1.121 0.511 *
Incentive 2005a: age 62 since 2005 -1.691 0.315 ** -2.774 0.611 ** -1.571 0.318 ** -1.678 0.316 **
Incentive 2005b: age 63 since 2005 -0.587 0.242 * -0.574 0.238 * -0.117 0.290 -0.559 0.242 *
A) Placebo-Incentives: 
Age 62 in 1992 -2.188 0.736 **
Age 62 in 1993 -1.793 0.698 *
Age 62 in 1994 -1.504 0.731 *
Age 62 in 1995 -1.615 0.743 *
Age 62 in 1996 -0.566 0.804
Age 62 in 1997 -0.528 0.776
Age 62 in 1998 -0.973 0.756
Age 62 in 1999 0.291 0.801








Age 61 in 2001-2004
Age 63 in 2001-2004 1.017 0.463 *
Age 64 in 2001-2004 0.359 0.472
Age 65 in 2001-2004 0.141 0.487
Age 66 in 2001-2004 -0.197 0.508
Age 67 in 2001-2004 0.559 0.589
Age 68 in 2001-2004 0.223 0.774
>= Age 69 in 2001-2004 1.330 1.338
Wald-Test: all placebos
χ
2(dF) z-value 13.23 (7) 0.067
Wald-Test: placebos 64-69
χ
2(dF) z-value 3.96 (6) 0.682









-1844.44 -1833.26 -1837.56 -1843.89
45 53 53 46
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes










no no (reference) no
no no no
no 21.77 (8) 0.005 ** no no
no 3.46 (4) 0.484 no no
no no no
no no no







(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Notes: See Table 5  30
















Log Likelihood -4237.09 -4224.91 -4223.06
# of parameters 52 55 55
AIC 8578.2 8559.8 8556.1
Log Likelihood -4212.43 -4202.51 -4200.85
# of parameters 60 63 63
AIC 8544.9 8531.0 8527.7
Log Likelihood -4200.71 -4190.83 -4189.28
# of parameters 86 89 89
AIC 8573.4 8559.7 8556.6
B - Men
Log Likelihood -6180.04 -6173.52 -6171.56
# of parameters 50 53 53
AIC 12460.1 12453.0 12449.1
Log Likelihood -6159.90 -6153.79 -6151.55
# of parameters 58 61 61
AIC 12435.8 12429.6 12425.1
Log Likelihood -6132.07 -6125.39 -6122.57
# of parameters 84 87 87
AIC 12432.1 12424.8 12419.1









age, year, education, marital 
status
age, year, education, marital 
status, industry, region
age, year





Note: Critical values of the chi
2 distribution are as follows: 1 percent level: 11.34 (3 df) and 5 percent 
level: 7.81 (3 df).  
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Table 8  Prediction Results Based on Multinomial Logit Estimation with Random  



























Age 62 , no incentive 0.464 0.465 0.456
Age 62 , incentive 2001 0.219 -53% 0.216 -53% 0.217 -52%
Age 62 , incentive 2005 0.210 -55% 0.207 -56% 0.206 -55%
Age 63 , no incentive 0.395 0.400 0.401
Age 63 , incentive 2005 0.299 -24% 0.295 -26% 0.296 -26%
Age 62 , no incentive 0.399 0.403 0.405
Age 62 , incentive 2001 0.222 -44% 0.220 -45% 0.219 -46%
Age 62 , incentive 2005 0.201 -49% 0.197 -51% 0.198 -51%
Age 63 , no incentive 0.371 0.376 0.378
Age 63 , incentive 2005 0.304 -18% 0.299 -21% 0.301 -20%
B - Men
Age 64 , no incentive 0.177 0.179 0.179
Age 64 , incentive 1997 0.193 10% 0.192 7% 0.192 7%
Age 63 , no incentive 0.131 0.130 0.129
Age 63 , incentive 2001 0.167 28% 0.167 28% 0.164 27%
Age 64 , no incentive 0.187 0.188 0.188
Age 64 , incentive 1997 0.192 3% 0.192 2% 0.191 2%
Age 63 , no incentive 0.136 0.137 0.136






Model (1) - controls for: age, 
year
Model (2) - controls for: age, 
year, education, marital status
Model (3) - controls for: age, 

























Specification (1): age, year 27.08 26 0.405
Specification (2): age, year, education, 
marital status
24.03 30 0.771
Specification (3): age, year, education, 
marital status, industry, region
32.64 43 0.875
B - Men
Specification (1): age, year 24.81 25 0.473
Specification (2): age, year, education, 
marital status
31.49 29 0.343
Specification (3): age, year, education, 




Note: Estimations were executed without random effects controls.  32
Table 10  Random Effects Logit Estimation: Heterogeneity of Incentive Effects  
 
Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff.
Incentive 2001: age 62 after 2001 -0.674 (0.470) - - -1.389 (0.284) ** - -
Incentive 2005a: age 62 after 2004 -1.670 (0.310) ** - - -1.629 (0.346) ** - -
Incentive 2005b: age 63 after 2004 -0.582 (0.240) * - - -0.534 (0.261) * - -
Inc. 2001 * Years Since Reform -0.401 (0.194) * - - - - - -
Inc. 2001 * Region: French - - - - -0.765 (0.531) - -
Inc. 2005a * Region: French - - - - -0.244 (0.508) - -
Inc. 2005b * Region: French - - - - -0.228 (0.382) - -
Incentive 1997: age 64 after 1996 - - -0.110 (0.361) - - 0.134 (0.253)
Incentive 2001: age 63 after 2000 - - 0.305 (0.359) - - 0.344 (0.237)
Inc. 1997 * Years Since Reform - - 0.035 (0.044) - - - -
Inc. 2001 * Years Since Reform - - 0.011 (0.089) - - - -
Inc. 1997 * Region: French - - - - - - -0.128 (0.269)
Inc. 2001 * Region: French - - - - - - -0.085 (0.294)
Region: French - - - - 0.282 (0.124) * -0.052 (0.114)
A g e  ( 9 ) * ** ** ** *
Year (15) * °
Education (3) ** ** ** **
Marital status (3)
Industry (8) ** **
Regions (6)
Individuals 1773 4720 1773 4720
Observations 3213 2450 3213 2450
















Women Men Women Men










    
Note: **, * and 
o indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. The numbers in 




Figure 1   Probability of a Transition to Retirement by Age over Time 
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Note: Most points in the graph are based on fewer than 30 observations. 




Figure 2  Predicted Retirement Probability Before and After Reform 
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Note: The differences in predicted retirement probabilities for women at age 62 with and without 
incentive mechanisms are statistically significantly different from zero for all but the highest 
education group. The difference at age 63 is significant for the middle education group. For men we 
find a significant difference in the middle education group for the retirement probability at age 63 
with and without incentives. Standard errors of the predicted probability differences were 
bootstrapped with 100 draws. The predictions are based on specification (3) of the binomial logit with 
a discrete distribution of the random effects using weighted data. 
 
 
 
 
 